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Abstract
In January 2008, the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority introduced the
second-generation capital requirement, Basel II, that substantially extended the
1988 Capital Accord of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. This paper
explains the main features of Basel II; reviews concerns about the likely effects of
the new capital requirement; and assesses the new capital requirement in the context
of the global financial crisis.
Introduction
In January 2008, the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) adopted
the new Capital Accord (Basel II) that had been developed by the Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision (BCBS). 2  Basel II is a much enhanced — meaning a
more risk-sensitive and comprehensive — version of the capital requirement on
banks, which is the principal regulatory tool of prudential supervision. The
original Capital Accord (Basel I) had been adopted by the Reserve Bank of
Australia (RBA) in 1988. It was meant to establish a minimum capital standard
for internationally active banks. In Australia it has been applied to all
authorised-depositing institutions (ADIs), except branches of foreign banks.
The development of the new Accord, which began in 1999, attracted
considerable debate and criticism, and while its form and detailed provisions
evolved in response to the debate, the introduced version (BCBS 2004b) has not
met with universal approval. The main objectives of this paper are to explain
the main features of the new Capital Accord as adopted by APRA and to assess
criticism of the new capital requirement in the light of the global financial crisis
(GFC) that was triggered by the US sub-prime loan crisis.
1  School of Finance and Economics, University of Technology, Sydney, chris.terry@uts.edu.au. JEL
Classification Numbers: G21, G28. This paper is based on work undertaken jointly with Peter Docherty.
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II, the referees for their comments and, especially, William Coleman for his considerable constructive
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The origin of the Capital Adequacy Requirement
The deregulation of financial systems during the 1970s and 1980s exposed their
banks to a more competitive and riskier environment, that led to concerns about
the stability of banks. These concerns motivated the establishment of the BCBS
(in 1974) and its development of a new regime of prudential supervision that
included a capital requirement. Capital provides a bank with a cushion to absorb
losses and so provides it and the prudential regulator with an opportunity to
resolve the risk the losses pose for the bank’s depositors. Two years after it
introduced its capital requirement (in 1986), the RBA modified the requirement
in line with the BCBS’s Capital Accord by basing the 8 per cent capital
requirement on the risk-weighted value of a bank’s assets rather than on the total
value of its assets (see RBA 1988; 1989). The requirement is the ratio of a bank’s
capital (as defined) — the numerator — to its risk-adjusted assets as the
denominator. This approach related (if crudely) the capital requirement to the
risk-management aim of prudential supervision.
The risk-adjustment under the Capital Accord initially employed five rule of
thumb credit-risk categories (subsequently reduced to four) into which a bank’s
assets were allocated. Low risk weights (zero and 20 per cent) were established
for less-risky assets. Loans secured by residential mortgages were assigned a
risk weight of 50 per cent, whereas all other loans were given a risk weight of
100 per cent. The denominator also included the credit-equivalent value of a
bank’s off-balance sheet exposures, such as its derivatives and standby credit
facilities drawn down at the initiative of the bank’s client, by including the
resulting amounts in the respective asset risk categories according to the identity
of the counterparty.
In July 1998 the RBA’s responsibility for bank supervision and the state-based
supervisory responsibilities for credit unions and building societies were
transferred to APRA, which was established following a public enquiry into the
functions of the financial system and its evolving nature. This organisation
became the prudential supervisor of all ADIs in Australia (except branches of
foreign-owned banks) and to which it continued to apply the requirements of
the Basel Accord. Stability of Australia’s financial system remained one of the
responsibilities of the RBA. (RBA 2008b: 67–71)
The Structure of Basel II
The original Basel Accord’s simplicity probably helped its introduction by
national prudential regulators. But the insensitivity to variations in risk (both
between and within risk categories) had the potential to increase the incentive
for risk-taking behaviour. Hogan & Sharpe (1997a and 1997b) and Gup (2003:
74), for example, argue that attaching a risk weight of 100% to all commercial
loans irrespective of counterparty allowed banks to pursue higher-risk (to achieve
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higher return) lending since this requires no more capital than less-risky lending
but has greater upside income potential. Basel II addressed this shortcoming by
enabling the use of a much wider range of credit-risk weights, by providing for
the use of different approaches to determining risk weights and by extending
the capital requirement to cover all risks banks face.
Basel II has three pillars. The first deals with a bank’s core capital requirement
(Pillar 1); the second allows for supervisor discretion to adjust this requirement
to allow for additional risk and particular circumstances (Pillar 2); and the third
fosters market discipline (Pillar 3).
The main features of Basle II’s pillars are introduced in turn.
Pillar 1: Capital requirements for core risks
Pillar 1 refines the calculation of regulatory capital in three important ways. First,
it uses a more granular approach to credit-risk weights; second, it provides banks
(subject to the regulator’s approval) with a choice of methods for calculating
risk weights for certain types of risk; and third, it incorporates operating risk
into the capital requirement. The anatomy of Pillar 1 is represented in Figure 1,
which shows the Basel II innovations in bold type to distinguish them from
those of Basel I. Note the introduction of three possible approaches to the
calculation of the capital requirement for credit risk under Basel II; the
standardised (externally set) risk weights and two approaches that rely on internal
ratings (the foundation internal ratings basis, FIRB, and the advanced internal
ratings basis, AIRB). Observe the introduction of a capital requirement for
operating risk also provides for three approaches to the calculation of the capital
requirement. An introduction to each innovation follows.
The calculation of the capital requirement for credit risk starts by dividing
a bank’s assets into five categories (corporate, sovereign, bank, retail and equity)
within which there are sub-groups reflecting the different risk parameters for
each asset type. The capital requirement for each represents an attempt to capture
the average probability that a loan to each category of borrower would default,
and the proportion of the loan that would be lost if default occurred.
Under the standardised approach, risk-weights are prescribed for each risk
category, where the risk of each is rated by the borrower’s externally-determined
credit-rating agency such as Standard and Poor’s (S&P). The value of the loans
in each category is multiplied by the prescribed risk weight and the product is
multiplied by 8 per cent to determine the minimum capital requirement. To
illustrate, there are six credit-rating grades for corporate loans, where grade 1
covers loans rated AAA to AA– (on Standard and Poor’s long-term scale), grade
2 covers A+ to A– and so on. The standard risk weights vary from 20 per cent
to 150 per cent for these grades (APRA, APS 112 and APG 112). While this is
the ‘default’ approach, which can be viewed as an extension of Basel I, it
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represents a substantial advance. Basel I used just four risk weights, two of
which (in Australia) covered the bulk of bank balance sheet assets. The
standardised approach requires an improvement in risk-management systems
to generate the data to satisfy Basel II’s more granular risk categories. Most ADIs
are using this approach, which is expected to generate, on average, a modest
reduction in regulatory capital (Egan 2007).
Figure 1: Capital requirement under Basel I and Basel II
Notes: The new features (under Basel II) are shown in bold
1 Foundation internal ratings based approach
2 Advanced internal ratings based approach
Source: APRA 2004: 14.
The more radical innovation is the provision for banks to use either of two
internal rating approaches subject to the regulator’s (that is, APRA) approval.
The foundation internal ratings-based approach (FIRB) uses internal estimates
of the probability of loan defaults (PD) and feeds this into a more complex
probability-based formula (that relies on the supervisor’s estimates of the other
risk components) to determine the risk weight to be used to calculate the amount
of capital to be held against the loan. The advanced internal ratings-based
approach (AIRB) uses internal estimates of loss given default (LGD) and the other
risk components (effective maturity and the exposure at default) in a prescribed
formula to determine the risk weight and hence the capital charge against a loan.
These approaches derive from the internal risk assessments banks (including
Australia’s big banks) began undertaking in the 1990s and thus Basel II can be
viewed as following industry practice.
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Basel II does not change the two methods that can be used for assessing the
capital requirement for market risk introduced in 1996. However, it introduced
a capital requirement for operational risk exposures. Operational risk refers to
the risk that losses may result from a lack of verification and control processes
(such as the loss of  4.9 billion at Société Généralé due to a trader’s ability to
circumvent operating systems that was revealed in January 2008). Three
approaches for assessing operating risk are available; two that are relatively
simple (the basic indicator and several standardised approaches) and the third
advanced measurement approach (AMA) could be used by banks ‘with advanced
operational risk measuring and modelling capabilities’. Under the standardised
approach, an ADI divides its activities into three categories — retail banking,
commercial banking and all other activities, which have different capital
requirements — and the sum of these requirements sets the ADI’s operational
risk-capital requirement. The capital requirement for retail and commercial
banking is based on an ADI’s gross outstanding loans and advances (as an
indicator of its operating risk exposure) whereas for the third category the capital
requirement is based on the ADI’s gross income from these activities (APRA,
APS114). To be accredited to use the advanced approach banks must have ‘an
operational risk management framework that is sufficiently robust to facilitate
quantitative estimates of the ADI’s ORRC (operational risk regulatory capital)
that are sound, relevant and verifiable’ in relation to the ‘complexity of the
ADI’s business’ (APRA, APS115: para. 21).
Three banks were accredited to use the advanced methods from January 2008
and a fourth (NAB) was given approval to use the foundation IRB approach.
Three other banks have applied to move to an IRB approach during 2008 and
are operating under Basel I in the meantime (RBA 2008a: 67). The advanced
approaches are expected to reward banks with modest reductions in regulatory
capital (for lower credit-risk exposures); although 10 per cent will be the
maximum reduction in 2008 and 2009 (under Pillar 2 provisions) while the banks
are demonstrating the performance of their risk-management models (Egan 2007).
Pillar 2: The Supervisory Review Process
Pillar 2 has two aspects. The first requires banks to assess their overall risk profile
(in addition to the risks specified under Pillar 1) and to calculate any further
capital that should be held against this additional risk. The additional risks
potentially identified under Pillar 2 include credit concentration risk, liquidity
risk, reputation and model risk. Consequently, Pillar 2 could be expected to add
to the amount of capital held by banks (and offset the lower credit-risk capital
requirement).
The second aspect of Pillar 2 is its inclusion of a ‘supervisory review process’.
This allows supervisors to evaluate each bank’s overall risk profile and to mandate
a higher prudential capital ratio where this is judged to be prudent (APRA, APS
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110). APRA’s decision to increase NAB’s capital requirement following its foreign
exchange losses (in January 2004) illustrates this process.
Pillar 3: Market Discipline
Pillar 3 requires disclosure of information regarding the calculation of bank
capital positions and risk-management processes designed to strengthen the
capacity of security markets to respond to changes in bank risk profiles. The
idea is that banks which the market judges to have increased their risk profiles
without adequate capital will have their securities sold down in debt and equity
markets. The additional costs that this will impose on financing bank operations
will provide an incentive for management to modify either the bank’s risk profile
or its capital base. This dimension of Basel II is thus designed to complement
Pillars 1 and 2 by providing additional discipline on bank risk-taking behaviour.
APRA’s prudential information disclosure requirements are most detailed for
the Australian-owned ADIs that use the advanced risk-management approaches
because of their use of internally-generated risk ratings. They are required to
report quantitative risk-management information on a semi-annual basis and
qualitative risk-management information on an annual basis, as well as reporting
basic capital-adequacy information on a quarterly basis. The reporting
requirements are less detailed for the ADIs that use the standard risk weights
and for overseas-owned ADIs, assuming their home regulator’s prudential
information disclosure requirements are equivalent to APRA’s (APRA June 2007
and APS330).
Securitisation
In this and the next sub-section Basel II’s approach to securitisation (BCBS 2004b:
120–43) and credit risk mitigation (BCBS 2004b: 31–51) within Pillar 1 are
introduced because of the role these processes played in the crisis triggered by
the US sub-prime loan debacle (which is discussed in section 5). The process of
moving assets (these principally have been housing loans) off the balance sheet
via securitisation (a variation of the ‘originate-to-distribute’ model used by
Australia’s loan originators) has been an important feature of bank asset-liability
management. In Australia it has been used especially by the regional banks.
The assets are securitised through the services of a special-purpose vehicle
(SPV) established by a bank. The SPV arranges the issue of asset-backed securities
(mortgage-backed securities, MBSs, where housing loans are involved) to
investors and pays the bank for the loans with the proceeds. The bank avoids
a capital requirement for the securitised assets provided the arrangement ensures
it is no longer exposed to any risks associated with the assets, such as the risks
that would arise if the originating bank agreed to any explicit credit enhancement
of the securities or from implicit liquidity or solvency support for the SPV which
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could result in the securitised assets being brought back onto the originator’s
balance sheet.
Credit-risk mitigation
An important dimension of Basel II is its treatment of credit-risk mitigation
techniques such as the use of collateral, guarantees (by a third party) and other
credit-risk reduction measures such as credit derivatives, which reduce the
amount of loss in cases of default. Credit-default swaps (CDS) are the most
extensively used credit derivative. They provide banks with the opportunity
to buy protection against default events on one or more of its assets, which
would reduce its credit risk. For example, a bank could purchase credit-risk
protection on a specified set of loans or corporate securities held by the bank
by issuing a CDS and paying a premium (this would be paid six monthly at the
agreed rate) to the party that decides to accept the credit risk (such as a bond
investment manager or another bank that wants to diversify its credit risks).
The protection seller faces the obligation to compensate the protection buyer
should pre-defined default events occur on the specified parcel of loans or
securities. Should a default event occur the bank would receive a compensation
payment and this lowers its loss given default, whereas should no default event
occur the seller would receive the premium payments without having to
compensate the bank.
Basel II explicitly recognises the role of banks’ increasing use of instruments
such as credit derivatives. Since these instruments reduce the risk of loss they
reduce a bank’s capital requirement. The reduction depends on the credit
standing of the provider of the credit-risk mitigation instrument, such as the
protection seller in the case of CDS. Thus the risk-weighted assets are adjusted
using a risk weight appropriate to the risk class of the protection seller. For
protection sold under the CDS, the same process is followed but the risk weight
applied is that appropriate to the reference credit being protected.
Concerns debated during the development of Basel II
During the development of Basel II there was extensive debate internationally
over the model’s continued use of the 8 per cent capital ratio, the model’s
pro-cyclical effects, the effectiveness of market discipline and its impact on bank
lending to small and medium-sized businesses. In Australia, concerns were
expressed that Basel II would result in a lower capital requirement on the big
banks than on the regional banks. These issues are considered below.
The amount of required capital
A primary concern was, and, is whether Basel II’s capital requirement is adequate.
In a structural sense this concern has two parts: should Basel II maintain the 8
per cent capital ratio and are the new risk weights in Pillar 1 (subject to any
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action under Pillar 2) adequate? The historical record in developed economies
over the last 30 years is that 90 per cent of failed institutions reported capital
ratios at or near the regulatory minimum just prior to failure (BCBS 2004a). This
raises the question of the requirement’s adequacy, if the purpose of the capital
requirement is to prevent bank insolvencies.
Gup (2004a) argued that the amount of regulatory capital implied by Basel
II is too low for banks in the United States. Gup reasoned that the operational
profile of US banks (in 2004) was much more risky than it was in 1988 on account
of three sources of their altered risk profile: increased exposure of US banks to
commercial property loans; an increased proportion of bank portfolios dedicated
to sub-prime lending; and greater exposure to derivatives markets. Gup’s
concerns about bank’s sub-prime assets and credit derivatives were well founded
and imply that the risk weights attached to these loans and contracts were
inadequate.
On the other hand, Altman, Bharath & Saunders (2002: 917–20) challenged
the credit-risk weights for the standardised approach in an earlier version of the
framework as well as the range of proposed risk categories for corporate loans.
They found using the default experience of US corporate bonds over the period
1981–99 that the capital requirements on highly rated borrowers (A and BBB/BB
classes) were significantly higher under the 2001 version of Basel II than is justified
by the default experience of such high-grade bonds (that is, borrowers), while
for more poorly rated borrowers (below BB) the risk weight was about right.
These findings held also for the 1989–92 recession; but clearly the findings are
not representative of the recent experience with securities backed by US
sub-prime housing loans or with similarly rated corporate bonds.
APRA estimated that Basel II’s introduction may marginally reduce the
Australian banking system’s required amount of capital and has advised that it
will take a cautious approach toward reductions in regulatory capital during
the initial years under Basel II (Egan 2007).
Australia’s 20-year experience with the Capital Accord suggests the amount
of regulatory capital has been adequate. Over this period there had been a
recession in the early 1990s (accompanied significantly by a collapse in the
commercial property market) when substantial losses were incurred at two large
Australian banks (Westpac and ANZ). The capital held by these banks absorbed
these losses and allowed them time to restore their capital ratios (Gizycki & Lowe
2000: 181–6). The results of the stress tests of the Australian financial system
conducted by the IMF in early 2006 — that the banking system would cope
(with reduced profits) under its macroeconomic shock scenarios — imply that
the banking system was holding adequate capital in the tested scenarios (RBA
2006: 46).
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Moreover, Australia’s banks have maintained capital ratios well above the
regulatory minimum. As a group, the Australian-owned banks have maintained
a capital ratio of between 10 and 12 per cent and credit unions and building
societies have maintained higher ratios since the introduction of Basel I, and
these capital ratios increased in 2008 (RBA 2008b: 26). Such ratios reflect each
bank’s judgement of the amount of capital it should use in its financing. These
judgements would depend on each bank’s calculations of its economic capital
requirement. Economic capital is the amount of capital a bank holds to protect
its solvency from unexpected losses (and from inadequate provisions against
expected losses). Its purpose is to ensure the bank is able to continue operating
(that is, remain solvent) should it incur unexpected losses. Since banks have
liabilities in addition to their deposits, a bank’s economic capital is likely to
exceed the regulatory requirement.
The evidence as at the end of 2008 (putting aside the Government’s recent
guarantee of bank liabilities) supports the conclusion that the capital requirement
under Basel II as applied by APRA has been adequate given the approach of
Australia’s ADIs toward risk taking and risk management and APRA’s approach
to prudential supervision.
The Pro-cyclical Nature of the Basel II Capital Standard
An important criticism of Basel II is its pro-cyclical effects on economic activity
that could amplify and prolong macroeconomic fluctuations. A substantial
literature has analysed the cyclical nature of probabilities of default, exposure
at time of default and losses given default and the consequences of capital
requirements that are adjusted for these cyclical risk factors (such as Resti 2002;
Kashyap & Stein 2004; Goodhart, Hofmann & Segoviano 2004; Illing & Paulin
2005; Altman et al. 2005). It is clear that regulatory capital under Basel II would
increase during recessions and decrease during periods of strong economic
growth. This view holds for each of the different methods for setting ratings
even though, as Altman and Saunders (2001) argue, changes in corporate security
ratings (by the major ratings agencies) tend to lag the changes in credit
conditions.
The pro-cyclical criticism assumes that bank capital is varied according to
movements in the minimum capital requirement. Banks in Australia have
consistently held capital well above their required minimum and thus have
always held a capital buffer. Consequently, proposals for Basel II’s capital
requirement to be set as an average risk across the cycle (Goodhart, Hofmann &
Segoviano 2004: 599) and that regulators embed a counter-cyclical capital buffer
in Pillar 2 during periods of economic growth that could be drawn upon during
an economic downturn may not seriously distort banks’ actual capital levels.
Implementation of the latter proposal, though, would need to harmonise with
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monetary policy and so require close cooperation (in Australia) between APRA
and the RBA.
While actual capital ratios may be less pro-cyclical than regulatory capital,
there is a good case for banks to hold a counter-cyclical capital buffer to improve
their financial stability (that is, capacity to absorb lower earnings and even
losses). Since the required return on equity falls as share prices increase (and
vice versa), the capital buffer would be raised when the cost of equity capital
is lower than if banks had to increase their capital when their share prices are
depressed.
Market Discipline
The effectiveness of disclosure requirements and market discipline is the subject
of a lengthy literature.
Bliss & Flannery (2001: 108–9) draw an important distinction between the
roles of monitoring and influence in assessing the potential effectiveness for market
discipline to enhance bank regulation. Information which is monitored, correctly
understood and acted upon by investors, so that it leads to changes in the market
prices of debt and equity, will result in effective bank discipline only if
management responds to the changed market prices with modified risk-taking
behaviour. They further point out monitoring behaviour has two pre-conditions.
The first is that participants must have an incentive to monitor. Depositors
covered by a perceived safety net are unlikely to have this incentive, while
equity holders and holders of debt which ranks below deposits are more likely
to have an incentive to monitor. The second is that the suppliers of funds must
have the ability to accurately interpret disclosed information. The common
answer is that most depositors are unlikely to have this ability while a greater
proportion of equity and subordinated debt holders could be expected to have
it, especially when they are institutional investors.
Flannery (1998) surveyed the evidence of monitoring and found that investors
respond to and correctly interpret changes in bank conditions, that there is little
evidence of irrational contagion and that on-site regulatory inspections contribute
at least some information that markets use to discipline banks. Esho, Kofman,
Kollo & Sharpe (2005) provide similar evidence that accounting risk measures
for Australian banks are accurately reflected in the risk spread on bank
subordinated debt over the return on Australian Government securities.
However, Bliss & Flannery (2001: 141) found little evidence to support the
influence dimension of market discipline and argued that it would be dangerous
for regulators to rely on a market discipline mechanism in the absence of evidence
that supports its existence. For this reason, commentators such as Gup (2004b:
82–4 and 86–8) and Kaufman (2004: 46) argue that Basel II’s Pillar 3 provisions
are likely to contribute little to effective bank supervision.
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Calomiris & Powell (2001), however, suggest an alternative channel by which
market discipline might enhance prudential supervision. They argue that the
monitoring effect may impose discipline not on bank managers but on regulatory
authorities, overcoming a problem of regulatory forbearance identified by Boot
& Thakor (1993). They argue that regulators may delay taking corrective action
when banks become financially distressed because of the high cost to taxpayers
of closing a troubled institution and, instead, rely on the hope of bank recovery.
The forbearance of APRA toward HIH in late 2000 and early 2001 prior to its
$5bn insolvency appears to be a case in point. The regulator delayed conducting
a formal investigation into HIH’s financial situation that should have been
triggered by its failure to submit its quarterly financial statement for December
2000. The HIH case, though, illustrates that the regulator was not influenced by
the market’s discipline since HIH’s share price fell sharply (from $1 to $0.20) in
late 2000. Presumably APRA will not repeat this mistake and so the introduction
of Pillar 3 should mean that the regulator will be influenced by market signals
and so place pressure on ADI management to do likewise.
Impact on small-business lending
Under Basel II loans to small and medium-sized businesses (SMEs) can be treated
as either retail loans or corporate loans. The former are pools of standardised
smaller loans whereas the latter are customised larger loans. Under Basel II retail
loans attract a lower capital charge (6 per cent); one reason for which is the view
that such loans are less sensitive to systemic risk than corporate loans (Jacobson,
Lindé and Roszbach 2005: 44). This view has attracted some debate but,
irrespective of its validity, Altman and Sabato (2005) argue that (particularly in
the US banking system) larger banks are more likely to be able to benefit from
the lower charge. Berger (2006), though, concludes otherwise, arguing that the
SME loan market is segmented and larger banks are unlikely to enter the segment
dominated by smaller banks. Given the dominant role of Australia’s large banks
in the SME loan market it seems unlikely that the treatment of retail loans under
Basel II will have much influence on small-business lending or on which banks
dominate this segment of bank lending.
Basel II and competitive neutrality
Under Basel II credit and operating risk weights determined under the standard
approach are likely to be higher than under the internal ratings approaches
(McDonald & Eastwood 2000; Egan 2004: 4; Egan 2007; BCBS 2003: 4). This
raised the concern that the smaller ADIs (the regionals, credit unions and building
societies) would be placed at a competitive disadvantage to the larger banks by
the different methods for calculating risk factors. Egan (2004: 7) disputed that
requiring smaller banks to hold larger amounts of capital represents a distortion
of competitive neutrality. Egan argued that small ADIs are inherently riskier
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than larger banks since they have less-diversified loan portfolios and so face
greater risk.
A related concern is the impact that Basel II might have on concentration in
the banking industry. Given that the internal-ratings approaches under Basel II
imply a lower regulatory capital requirement (than the standard approach) they
represent an economy of scale that would encourage consolidation between
banks. The merits of this potential impact would depend on the form of
consolidation and whether the outcomes are anti-competitive. Mergers between
regionals (such as between Bendigo and Adelaide banks) would be less likely to
be anti-competitive than mergers with a big bank (such as between Westpac
and St George and between the Commonwealth and BankWest). Where mergers
enable the new organisation to adopt superior risk-measurement techniques this
would be in the public interest. But fewer bigger banks intensifies the ‘too big
to fail’ dilemma for APRA and ultimately for the community (through the cost
of bail-outs, should they occur). A more concentrated banking industry may
also increase contagion risk within the wholesale payment system.
Basel II and the global financial crisis
The GFC began to take hold in 2007. Its origins can be traced to a boom in US
housing prices between 2002 and 2005 and the rapid growth of sub-prime housing
loans following a doubling of the amount of prime loans between 2001 and 2003.
Consequently, the crisis largely preceded the introduction of Basel II, which in
Australia was at the start of 2008 whereas in the USA it was introduced over
2008 in parallel with the current requirements and applied only to the large
internationally-active banks.
Sub-prime loans are those made to borrowers with a weak capacity to make
their loan payments (compared with prime loans) and thus an increase in such
lending represents a decline in lending standards. Sub-prime loans though were
encouraged in the US as a way of democratising lending by providing loans to
those who were not eligible for prime loans, including minorities. The loans’
business model, though, was flawed because it depended on continuously rising
prices for the mortgaged properties. The assumed capital gain served to
compensate the lender for losses from loan delinquencies or encouraged
delinquent borrowers to refinance with the lender at a higher interest rate.
The growth in lending for housing promoted an increase in the supply of
housing that resulted in the stock of housing exceeding the demand. This led
to a fall in housing prices that was exacerbated by the high (and rising) rate of
mortgagee sales from the sub-prime loans. The crisis quickly spread to the
securities markets because most of the sub-prime loans were securitised through
asset-backed commercial paper (short-term securities that provided initial finance
for the loans) and MBSs (long-term bonds that ultimately funded the loans). The
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value of the highest-rated (AAA) of these securities (surprisingly, most MBSs
based on sub-prime loans were rated AAA) halved between July 2007 and March
2008, which created a major credit crisis for two reasons. First, new issuers could
not borrow because they could not afford the resulting higher interest rate and,
second, investors only wanted to sell the securities; and so liquidity in both the
primary and secondary markets for MBSs dried up.
The crisis spread to the related markets for structured securities such as
collateralised-debt obligations (the collateral for which was sub-prime loans)
and for credit-default swaps, drying up liquidity in these markets. A related
feature of the credit crisis was the retreat by investors to US Treasury and other
‘safe’ bonds, driving down their yields and further widening the credit spreads
between them and those for structured and similar securities. The crisis spread
to the large US investment banks (they were not subject to prudential
supervision) as well as commercial banks when it became clear that they held
large amounts of these (‘toxic’) securities on their balance sheets and this
contracted the flow of funds by banks (and even more disturbingly) between
banks. The global nature of the affected financial markets and a surprising lack
of information about banks’ exposures (which spread fear) meant the credit crisis
quickly became global in scope.
The BCBS, along with other pan-national agencies (Knight 2008), has analysed
the causes of the threat the GFC poses for global financial stability and the
Committee announced (in March 2008) it was developing four amendments to
Basel II in response:
1. In relation to Pillar 1 it was examining the adequacy of the capital charge for
structured securities given their highly correlated risk exposure (being backed
by assets of the same type) which led to their sudden downgrading. The
value-at-risk method of assessing the capital requirement for such securities
during periods of low volatility did not adequately reflect their credit risk when
volatility suddenly increased. Concern had been expressed when Basel II was
being developed about the shortcomings of value-at-risk models in the context
of financial system instability. (Goodhart, Hofmann and Segoviano 2004: 598)
2. The Committee was also developing a credit-default risk charge on assets held
in banks’ trading books. This is in recognition of the credit risk posed by
structured credit products that do not have a liquid secondary market.
3. In relation to Pillar 2 the BCBS is proposing that regulators widen their stress
tests of banks’ risk-management systems to include contingent credit exposures
such as those that arose when banks took back securitised (or collateralised)
assets for reputation reasons.
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4. The BCBS is also reviewing its disclosure requirements (under Pillar 3) in
relation ‘to securitisations, conduits and the sponsorship of off-balance sheet
vehicles’ (Wellink 2008; BCBS 2008b).
Prior to the crisis the BCBS had began a review of liquidity-risk management
and supervision, but given that market and funding illiquidity are core aspects
of the credit crisis, the work was given greater priority. The intention is to
strengthen its standards for liquidity-risk management and supervision, especially
in relation to liquidity stress testing that includes off-balance sheet exposures
and for funding capacity during periods of wholesale market funding illiquidity;
as well as its reporting and disclosure standards relating to liquidity (BCBS
2008a). APRA has responded by intensifying its monitoring of bank liquidity
and by strengthening its liquidity-management requirements on banks.
The GFC provides a real-life stress test of the stability of the financial system
and the regulatory framework that is intended to promote the financial system’s
stability. Basel II forms a fundamental part of the prudential supervision of
individual banks that serves to strengthen their individual stability through
their capital buffer; but it does not aim to ensure financial system stability.
Consequently, despite its recognised flaws, which the BCBS has moved to remedy,
Basel II did not contribute to the emergence of the GFC. As noted above, the
origins of the crisis pre-dated the introduction of Basel II in the USA. The same
cannot be said about the anti-regulation political culture in the USA.
In the USA, sub-prime lenders included non-depository ‘mono-line’ lenders
(referred to in Australia as ‘loan originators’) and large banks, as well as
community banks, consumer finance companies and thrifts, many of whom
along with investment banks arranged the issue of MBSs (Ashcraft and
Schuermann 2008). As noted above, Basel II has been applied in the US only to
their internationally active commercial banks. The widespread use of
originate-to-distribute lending in the US has been referred to as a ‘shadow
banking system’ that increasingly relied on a flawed originate-to-distribute
model (Ashcraft and Schuermann 2008 detail the various flaws), which in the
case of sub-prime loans was based on a business model that itself was seriously
flawed (because of its reliance on ever-increasing housing values and its
incentives for predatory lending and borrowing). It should be recalled that the
process of securitisation that enabled the originate-to-distribute lending model
was an acclaimed financial innovation that accessed investors’ funds for housing
loans and so placed competitive pressure on bank lending.
The question for the prudentially-regulated banks that decided to undertake
either sub-prime lending or underwrite the issue of MBSs (or otherwise establish
an exposure to structured securities) is why their capital requirement (their
capital ratios exceeded those of Basel I) did not motivate them to act more
prudently. The answer appears to be that the motivation provided by their
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capital requirement to act prudently was outweighed by the pressure posed by
competing institutions that were making profits from their appetite for risk
taking; greed outweighed fear. The related question is: why did their prudential
regulator tolerate their risk exposures? There is now a growing literature
criticising the forbearance of financial and prudential supervision in the United
States (Kane 2008; and Ashcraft and Schuermann, 2008). The role of ratings
agencies and their supervision has also been criticised given the conflict of
interest faced by the ratings agencies in assigning their AAA rating to securities
based on sub-prime loans.
Fortunately, this debacle was not replicated in Australia. Sub-prime lending
was largely confined to three smaller loan originators (Pepper, Bluestone and
Liberty Financial) and Australia’s banking system had very little exposure to
the toxic securities (Debelle 2008: 43). Consequently the banks were not under
competitive pressure to enter this segment of the loan market. The initial impact
in Australia was in the inter-bank market, where the Australian banks became
reluctant to lend to each other, preferring instead to increase their balances held
with the RBA.
The main impact in Australia has been via the higher credit spreads in
overseas financial markets, which had a relatively greater impact on non-bank
lenders (the loan originators) because domestic and overseas MBSs markets had
been their funding source. Deprived of funds, these lenders switched into
mortgage brokerage, leaving the banks with an even larger share of the
housing-loan market. The Government’s guarantee of ADI liabilities has further
strengthened the position of the large banks within the Australian financial
system (RBA 2008b: 21–36).
APRA’s review of credit standards for housing loans in 2006 (as well as the
RBA’s efforts to contain Australia’s housing prices in 2002 and 2003) represented
a stricter regulatory environment than occurred in the US. APRA’s Chairman
concluded a speech made in June 2007 with the following observations:
In repeating our concerns about credit standards, I am conscious that APRA
might be perceived to be ‘crying wolf’ too often on housing lending. No one
would welcome a continuation of Australia’s economic strength and the recent
resilience of most housing markets — from which ADIs have been major
beneficiaries — more than the prudential regulator. Nonetheless, the risk currents
in housing lending have been moving, slowly but inexorably, in one direction
only and this demands careful management by our regulated lenders, and
constant vigilance on APRA’s part. (Laker 2007)
The comparison between the US and Australia’s experience is instructive.
Supervised banks in both systems employed similar levels of capital but many
of the large US banks behaved less prudently than the large Australian banks
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and the Australian financial regulators displayed much more vigilance than the
US regulators.
Conclusions
Basel II represents a substantial improvement on Basel I because of its more
extensive integration of the capital requirement within the prudential supervision
framework through its greater risk-sensitivity and comprehensive coverage of
banking risks. Shortcomings (particularly in the modelling of credit risk) revealed
by the GFC are being addressed, which should ultimately strengthen Basel II.
Of the concerns debated during the development of Basel II the main
outstanding issue is its pro-cyclical effect. It is unlikely to be evident during
the current economic crisis because of the greater effects of the GFC; illiquidity
of markets and the tightening of lending standards by banks. But Basel II should
be modified to counter its pro-cyclical effect.
The main lesson of the GFC for Basel II is that bank capital is a necessary but
not sufficient requirement for a bank’s stability. Prudential regulators need to
be vigilant because the intended influence of the capital requirement on banks’
risk-taking behaviour can be outweighed when competing institutions profit
from their greater risk appetite, especially when there is a too-ready acceptance
of financial innovation.
References
Altman, E. and Saunders, A. 2001, ‘An Analysis and Critique of the BIS Proposal
on Capital Adequacy and Ratings’, Journal of Banking and Finance 25(1):
25–46.
Altman, E. I., Bharath, S. T. & Saunders, A. 2002, ‘Capital Ratings and the BIS
Capital Adequacy Reform Agenda’, Journal of Banking and Finance 26:
909–21.
Altman, E. and Sabato, G. 2005, ‘Effects of the New Basel Capital Accord on
bank Capital Requirements for SMEs’, Journal of Financial Services
Research 28: 1/2/3, 15–42
Altman, E., Brady, B., Resti, A. and Sironi, A. 2005, ‘The Link between Default
and Recovery Rates: Theory, Empirical Evidence and Implications’,
Journal of Business 78(6): 2203–27.
Ashcraft, Adam B. and Schuermann, Til 2008, ‘Understanding the Securitization
of Subprime Mortgage Credit’, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff
Reports: 318
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 2004, ‘The Basel II Capital Framework
in Australia’, APRA Insight, 4th Quarter 2004: 13–18.
40
Agenda, Volume 16, Number 1, 2009
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 2007, Implementation of the Basel
II Capital Framework; Market disclosure, Discussion Paper, June.
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 2008, Prudential Standard APS 110
Capital Adequacy, January.
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 2008, Prudential Standard APS 112
Capital Adequacy: Standardised Approach to Credit Risk, January.
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 2008, Prudential Practice Guide APG
112 — Standardised Approach to Credit Risk, January.
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority 2008, Prudential Standard APS 115:
Capital Adequacy: Advanced Approaches to Operational Risk, January.
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2003, Consultative Document: Overview
of the New Basel Capital Accord, April, Basel: Bank for International
Settlements.
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2004a, ‘Bank Failures in Mature
Economies’, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Working Paper
Series, No. 13, April.
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2004b, International Convergence of
Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework, June,
Basel: Bank for International Settlements.
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2008a, Liquidity Risk: Management and
Supervisory Challenges, February.
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2008b, Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision announces steps to strength the resilience of the banking
committee, April, www.bis.org/
Berger, A. 2006, ‘Potential Competitive Effects of Basel II on Banks in SME Credit
markets in the United States’, Journal of Financial Services Research 29(1):
5–36
Bliss, R. R. & Flannery, M. J. 2001, ‘Market Discipline in the Governance of U.S.
Bank Holding Companies: Monitoring versus Influencing’, Mishkin F.
S. (ed.), Prudential Supervision: What Works and What Doesn’t, Chicago:
Chicago University Press: 107–43.
Boot, A. & Thakor, A. V. 1993, ‘Self-Interested Bank Regulation’, American
Economic Review 83: 206–12.
Calomiris, C. W. & Powell, A. 2001, ‘Can Emerging Market Bank Regulators
Establish Credible Discipline? The Case of Argentina 1992–99’, in
Mishkin F. S. (ed.), Prudential Supervision: What Works and What
Doesn’t, Chicago: Chicago University Press: 146–90.
41
The new Basel Capital Accord
Debelle, G. 2008, ‘A Comparison of the US and Australian Housing Markets’,
RBA Bulletin (June): 35–46.
Egan, B. 2004, ‘APRA Update: Basel II Implementation in Australia’, The
Australian Financial Review’s 5th Annual BankTech Conference, 14
September.
Egan, B. 2007, ‘Meeting the Challenges of the Implementation of Basel II’,
apra.gov.au/speeches
Esho, N., Kofman, P., Kollo, M. G. & Sharpe, I. G. 2005, ‘Market Discipline &
Subordinated Debt of Australian Banks’, Australian Prudential Regulation
Authority Working Paper Series, October.
Flannery, M. J. 1998, ‘Using Market Information in Prudential Bank Supervision:
A Review of the U.S. Empirical Evidence’, Journal of Money Credit and
Banking 30(3): 273–305.
Gizycki, M. & Lowe, P. 2000, ‘The Australian Financial System in the 1990s’,
Gruen, D. & Shrestha, S. (eds), Sydney: Reserve Bank of Australia:
180–215.
Goodhart, C. A. E., Hofmann, B. & Segoviano, M. 2004, ‘Bank Regulation and
Macroeconomic Fluctuations’, Oxford Review of Economic Policy 20(4):
591–615.
Gup, B. 2003, ‘A Brief History of Basel’, Journal of Banking and Financial Services
117(5): 74–5.
Gup, B. 2004a, ‘The New Basel Accord: Is 8% Adequate?’ in Gup, B. (ed.), The
New Basel Capital Accord, New York, Thomson: 11–28.
Gup, B. 2004b, ‘Market Discipline: Is It Fact or Fiction?’ in Gup, B. (ed.), The
New Basel Capital Accord, New York, Thomson: 67–96.
Hogan, W. & Sharpe, I. G. 1997a, ‘Prudential Regulation of the Financial System:
A Functional Approach’, Agenda 4: 15–28.
Hogan, W. & Sharpe, I. G. 1997b, ‘Financial System Reform: Regulatory Structure,
Financial Safety, Systemic Stability and Competition Policy’, The
Economic and Labour Relations Review: 318–32.
Illing, M. & Paulin, G. 2005, ‘Basel II and the Cyclicality of Bank Capital’,
Canadian Public Policy 31(2): 161–80.
Jacobson, T., Lindé, J. and Roszbach, K. 2005, ‘Credit Risk Versus Capital
Requirements under Basel II: Are SME Loans and Retail credit Really
Different?’, Journal of Financial Services Research 28:1/2/3, 43–75.
Kane, Edward J. 2008, ‘Ethical failures in Regulating and Supervising the Pursuit
of Safety Net Subsidies’, available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=12735616
42
Agenda, Volume 16, Number 1, 2009
Kashyap, A. K. & Stein, J. C. 2004, ‘Cyclical Implications of the Basel II Capital
Standards’, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Economic Perspectives, 1st
Quarter: 18–31.
Kaufman, G. G. 2004, ‘Basel II: The Roar that Moused’, in Gup, B. (ed.), The New
Basel Capital Accord, New York, Thomson: 39–52.
Knight, M. D. 2008, ‘Weaknesses revealed by the market turmoil: where do we
go from here?’ bis.org/speeches
Laker, John 2007, ‘Credit Standards in Housing Lending — some further
insights’, apra.gov.au/speeches
McDonald, A. & Eastwood, G. 2000, ‘Credit Risk Rating at Australian Banks’,
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority Working Paper No.7,
December.
Reserve Bank of Australia 1988, Capital Adequacy of Banks, Prudential Statement
No. C1, Sydney.
Reserve Bank of Australia 1989, ‘The New Capital Adequacy Guidelines for
Australian Banks’, Reserve Bank of Australia Bulletin, January: 6–12.
Reserve Bank of Australia 2006, Financial Stability Review, September: 46–9.
Reserve Bank of Australia 2008a, Financial Stability Review, March.
Reserve Bank of Australia 2008b, Financial Stability Review, September.
Resti, A. 2002, The new Basel capital accord; Structure, possible changes, micro-
and macroeconomic effects, Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies.
Wellink, Nout 2008, ‘Basel II — market developments and financial institution
resiliency’, Speech at Basel II Implementation Summit, Singapore, March
2008.
43
The new Basel Capital Accord
